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1 Introduction
This is a critical exploration of the relation between two common assumptions
concerning the differences between computation in humans and machines, and
its bearing on cognitive inquiries: The first assumption is that at least some
human-specific cognitive abilities are essentially non-computational, whereas the
second assumption is that there are principled limitations to what machine-based
computation can accomplish with respect to simulating or replicating these abil-
ities. I take the conjunct of these two assumptions to be the most forceful anti-
computationalist charge against the research programme of Artificial Intelligence
(AI) in general and against the possibility of strong AI in particular.1 Strong AI is
understood here as a class of, paradigmatically digital, computing machines that
display at least a significant subset of otherwise specifically human-like cognitive
abilities, and that do so on a human or near-human level, where that set might in-
clude but will not be limited to meaningful and social language use, embodiment,
intuition, inventiveness and consciousness.
The anti-computationalist views that build on a necessary connection between
the two above assumptions typically proceed by defining machines in such a way
that their operations necessarily, namely by definition, will be confined to the
computational domain, while computation is defined so narrowly, namely as dig-
ital, Turing-Machine-computation, that it appears wholly or largely irrelevant to
explaining or simulating human cognitive abilities.
I will argue in this essay that these definitions and the assumptions they sup-
port are problematic, and that the relation between them is tenuous. My argument
will build on the observation that “it is far from obvious that the theoretical lim-
its of human computation and the theoretical limits of machine computation need
coincide” (Copeland 1997, 690). Contemporary accounts of computation and the
computational mind, in particular “mechanistic” ones, will be discussed as alterna-
tive, broader yet more precise accounts of computation in physical systems and its
bearing on cognition.Still, the following argument will remain partly sceptical of
computationalism, admitting that the human mind might well be computational in
some relevant respects while maintaining that it might not be not computational
in all relevant respects. This argument should be viewed largely separate from
the related-but-distinct question of computational models of human cognition in
Artificial Intelligence.
With respect to the scope and style of this paper, I should remark that, despite
its reference to physical computing, intensional identity and extensional equiva-
lence, it does not carry an ambition to be a genuine contribution to the philosophy
1 Such an anti-mechanist and basically essentialist stance is adopted by the most prominent
classical critiques of classical AI, who argue that computer systems of any kind will always
and by natural necessity lack some of the properties that are constitutive to human cognition.
Dreyfus (1992) argues that computers rely on the ability of formalising knowledge, whereas
human knowledge is in important respects and in key areas informal and based on embodiment
and intuition. Searle (1980) argues that computers lack the ability to understand language, for
want of being socialised into human social and linguistic contexts. To turn to a slightly more
contemporary and significantly less essentialist critique of AI, Collins and Kusch (1998) argue
that machines might be able to imitate human behaviours of high complexity in “mimeomor-
phic” fashion, but that they will not be able to deliberately take different behavioural routes
to one and the same goal, as such “polimorphic” action would require an understanding of the
purposes of seemingly variant behaviours.
Invention, Intension and the Limits of Computation 3
of mathematics in general or the philosophy of computation from within those
fields. It is far too general, non-technical and free-form for this purpose. Instead,
it seeks to provide a slightly different perspective on a long-standing topic from a
viewpoint more aligned with the history and philosophy of science.
The argument will be structured as follows: In Section 2, I will formulate a
research question on computation in human beings and machines and suggest
alternative, more informative versions of it along with a focus on physical compu-
tation. Section 3 offers a comparative look at computation in human beings and
digital computing machines on the background of Alan Turing’s theory of com-
putability. Section 4 briefly outlines the concepts of intensional and extensional
equivalence and its import on the present argument. Section 5 will discuss some of
the possible non-computational aspects of human cognition, with exemplary focus
on human inventiveness, and their implications on computational models of cogni-
tion. Section 6 will match the possible limitations of machine-based computation
against the possible limitations of human inventiveness. Section 7 might not be
able to provide fully-fledged conclusions, but it will offer some tentative lessons
that might help to develop answers to the questions formulated in Section 2 at
some other time, in some larger project.
2 Framing the problem
Given the assumed relation between computation and cognition outlined above,
one might be able to formulate a research question that avoids the contentious and
ill-defined notion of cognition in favour for the slightly better defined but also con-
tentious notion of computation. After all, an understanding of what computation
is will partly define what cognition can be. Minimally, computation is understood
as execution of elementary arithmetical routines that produce definite solutions
in finite time, where these routines only require a minimum of mathematical skill
while in conjunction allowing for the solution of more complex logico-mathematical
problems.
Even with such a minimal definition in place, there will be widely diverging
interpretations of its relation to cognition. To the full-blown computationalist,
computation (in a certain narrow sense) will plainly be cognition (Pylyshyn 1980).
To the anti-computationalist, computation (in the same narrow sense) will be what
cognition is not. To the pan-computationalist, everything, including cognition, is
computation (in an extremely wide sense). Others redefine the concept of com-
putation in such a way that it only includes the manipulation of meaningful or
generally language-like structures, which makes it something other than the meta-
mathematical tool as which it was intended. To the inhabitants of any position in
between, an array of intermediate notions of computation will have to be matched
against a variety of cognitive processes and their elements. Cognition will involve
computation to some extent, at some level, and it allows for computational mod-
elling to some extent, at some level. At least in most respects, the definition of
computation is independent of the definition of cognition, while the latter typi-
cally at least partly depends on the former on any computational view. Hence, one
possible way of formulating a research question is this:
Q0 What is the difference between computation in human beings and machines?
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As it stands, this question is extremely unspecific though, as it would require the
notions of computation and machine to be sufficiently defined beforehand. These
definitional issues will be addressed in due course, but even with that clarification
in place, the question remains by far too general and too little meaningful to
be fully explicated, let alone answered in one short paper. However, there is a
different, more semantic than terminological vagueness that is inherent to the
above question. This vagueness lies in the possibility of unpacking Q0 into two
alternative questions:
Qa What is the difference between a human when s/he computes and a machine
when it computes, qua their activities?
Qb What is the difference between a computing human being and a computing
machine, qua their respective nature?
Of these two questions, only Qb addresses ontological issues concerning the nature
of computation, human beings and machines, but a prima facie plausible line of
reasoning between them might be this: The activities (re Qa) are different because
the nature of human beings and machines (re Qb) is different. They would have
to accomplish the same computational tasks in the same way in order to possibly
count as equivalent, and hence in the sense that is similar to what is called inten-
sional identity (more about which in Section 4) in the philosophy of mathematics.
It is this line of reasoning that I wish to put into question. A difference in activities
does not pre-empt any judgement on a difference in nature. Conversely, we might
find some form of analogy or equivalence in activities without having to assume
analogy or equivalence in nature. Extensional equivalence in activities might be
sufficient in many relevant cases.
If we want to grasp the extent of possible analogies and equivalences in nature
instead, the initial question Q0 might be rephrased in yet another way:
Qc What are the limits of computation in human beings and machines respec-
tively?
Again, the question is too fundamental and too general to be usefully addressed
here, but the previously outlined argument might help to demarcate the domains
of computation in human beings and machines respectively, and to compare them.
In doing so, the discussion of the limits of, and differences in, computation will refer
to the notion of physical computation, understood as the concrete ways in which
computations are accomplished or “implemented” in concrete physical systems,
of which there are various competing accounts.2 The limits of physical computa-
tion are defined not by logico-mathematical principles alone, but in addition by
concrete physical enablers and constraints. Physical computation does not enjoy
the privilege of infinite time, infinite storage or other hypothetical conditions that
can be mobilised in accounts of computability-in-principle in logic and mathe-
matics. Instead, theories of physical computation task themselves with identifying
the conditions under which any kind of processes, natural or other, will count as
2 The concept of physical computation was first explicated by Putnam (1975). Its trivialis-
ing implication that every system implements every computation, given an arbitrarily chosen
computational description (which was welcome to Putnam as a critic of computationalism and
AI), led to a diversification of accounts that proposed causal, descriptive or counterfactual
constraints on the sets of physical processes admitted to the domain of computation, most
prominently by Chalmers (1995, 1996); Copeland (1996); Pitowsky (1990); Rescorla (2014).
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a computation in light of a real-world-minded definition of computation and its
elements.
If the computational processes under consideration here are physical processes
that depend on the concrete conditions within and around the concrete systems
in question, and if these concrete conditions work as enablers and constraints
on what kind of computational systems human beings and machines can be, the
domains of computation in human beings and machines might turn out to be
quite independently determined and delimited. At the same instance, they might
have a limited but instructive bearing on questions of cognition in either kind
of system, to the extent that machine-based computation can or cannot realise
certain cognitive processes, and to the extent that human computation serves as
a model for machine computation. This is the case I will at least begin to make in
what follows.
3 Delimiting computation and cognition
The theoretical machine first devised by Alan Turing (1936), introduced as the
Logical Computing Machine (LCM) and later known as the Turing Machine, orig-
inally stood in the service of developing his theory of computability, which sought
to apply the methods of arithmetic to solve meta-mathematical problems, and
primarily needs to be understood in this light. Still, the design of this theoretical
machine was then used to inform the design of real machines to a significant ex-
tent, which partly eclipsed its original purpose. On an abstract level, however, any
system that adhered to the set of basic operational principles specified by Turing
would be able to perform logical computations.
A basic and prima facie uncontroversial reconstruction of Turing’s original
(1936) definition of computation (which he famously never made fully explicit)
might look like this:
c.1 The domain condition: The domain of computable functions is exhausted by
the functions that are ‘effectively calculable’ in such a way that they can be
solved, in principle, by an LCM.
c.2 The specification condition: An LCM comprises of a finite set of symbols, a finite
set of possible states, a transition function and a potentially infinite memory.
Remarkably, the mechanical operational principles of the LCM specified in c.2 were
modelled on the operations and “configurations” of mechanical typewriters – mov-
ing type heads over tape, writing, but also reading and erasing symbols (Hodges
1983, 96-98) – whereas the LCM’s mathematical operational principles that delimit
the domain of computation in c.1 were defined with respect to human computa-
tional abilities, and concretely modelled on the behaviour of human computers,
who inadvertently bequeathed their class noun to digital computers (Copeland
1997, 2017): Their task was to accomplish complex calculations in a collective
but centrally governed, namely algorithmic fashion, in which higher-order logico-
mathematical operations are broken down into elementary arithmetical routines
that could be accomplished with only a modicum of mathematical skills.
In human computing, thus conceived, only a small subset of cognitive abilities
is involved. On this level, human computation is distinguished from higher-order
human mathematical and other cognitive skills by not even potentially involving
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inventiveness, intuition, creativity or any other abilities of which we do not know
whether or to what extent the are amenable to formalisation. Only this small
subset of abilities is considered as a template or model for computation. Even
more significantly, it is thus considered only in the form of the behaviours that
it governs, not in its mode of realisation. Hence, mechanical computation in Tur-
ing’s theoretical sense and machine computation in concrete devices are at least
prima facie restricted to the tightly circumscribed analogy with the rule-governed
behaviour of human computers. Neither the mode of realisation and therefore the
inner nature of human computational skills nor the nature of other elements of
human cognition will have a bearing on this analogy. Hence, a workable account
of computation will not depend on a given state of human knowledge about the
inner workings of any of these abilities.
This situation could be otherwise only under either of two strictly disjunct con-
ditions: Machine computation would not be restricted to the behavioural analogy
to human computation, as conceived of by Turing (1936),
e.1 if the concrete mode of realisation of computational abilities within human
beings were a necessary precondition of the performance of any computation.
e.2 if machine computation in the theoretical and concrete sense were not restricted
to LCM-type computation.
Condition e.1 would altogether undermine the original concept of computation, for
being the exact opposite of the idea of computational operations to be multiply
realisable in any suitably specified system that lies at the very heart of Turing’s
idea of the LCM. It would require type-identity where functional analogy and
equivalence of operations were expressly intended to be sufficient. Condition e.1
is not only overly restrictive but also implausible, as any real-world machine that
performs computations in the way specified for the LCM bears testimony to the
possibility to performing computations in other than human-specific ways. Other-
wise, the notion of human computation would have to be enriched to a point that
contradicts the definition under consideration here.
In this latter spirit, condition e.2 would ask for computation to involve elements
that Turing expressly excluded from his concept. Alternatively, it suggests this
concept to be amended if deeper analogies are discovered or anticipated that make
computation appear a less restricted phenomenon. Either way, the question would
be whether the phenomenon in question, if retaining the label “computation” at
all, can still be analysed in terms of Turing’s theory of computation. This line of
reasoning has been followed by various accounts, such as Mi lkowski (2013, 2018);
Piccinini (2015), that seek to unshackle the concept of computation from Turing’s
original definition and make it more compatible with contemporary psychology
and neuroscience while others, such as Copeland (1996), seek to accomplish the
latter by making Turing’s notion more precise while otherwise staying true to it.
Once condition e.1 has been duly dismissed and condition e.2 duly qualified,
any possible equivalence between human and machine computation can be more
precisely described as follows: As far as internal processes that realise computa-
tions are concerned, human computation involves other processes than machine
computation does, but a clearly delimited analogy in observable behaviours that
accomplish a clearly delimited set of operations will suffice to establish a certain
kind of equivalence between human and machine computation. The kind of equiva-
lence in question will be extensional by definition. This general kind of equivalence
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became mainfest already in the development of the early theories of computation.
It concerned the question whether the methods of determining the decidability of
first-order logic in Turing’s, Church’s and other approaches at that time all pro-
duced the same result. Extensional equivalence refers to the observation shared
between them that the various methods involved indeed produced the same result
(Piccinini 2017).
4 Extensional equivalence and intensional identity
Extensional equivalence in this context, and some of its implications, will be best
understood in light of the conceptual pair of extensionality and intensionality,
which makes related appearances in logic, mathematics and the philosophy of
language, beginning with the work of Gottlob Frege (1892). A sentence, phrase
or other linguistic context is considered extensional, first, if co-referential terms
within that context can be mutually substituted in truth-preserving fashion and,
second, if the context allows for existential generalisation. (“Morning star” and
“evening star” refer to the same celestial object, and if there are a morning star
or evening star which are shining, there will exist at least one object that shines.)
In contrast, intensionality is a quality of linguistic contexts that depends on the
sense, in Fregean terms, of its elements, in which identical referential relations (to
the same celestial object) are differently expressed (as morning star and evening
star respectively). Depending on such differences in their mode of presentation
(“Art des Gegebenseins”, Frege 1892, 26-7) to speakers, and depending on the
speakers’ respective knowledge, beliefs and predispositions, linguistic items may
be differently used and perceived, with potentially differential effects on their truth
or falsity even if they are coreferential. In particular, intensional contexts, which
are sentences or phrases that report beliefs, neither guarantee a truth-preserving
substitution of coreferential terms, nor do they guarantee the possibility of existen-
tial generalisation. (If “I believe that the morning star is shining” is true, it might
still be false that “I believe that the evening star is shining”, if I do not know that
they are the same object, and I might be mistaken in my beliefs concerning the
existence of shining objects to begin with.) In consequence, two sentences will be
intensionally equivalent only if they not merely refer to the same subject matter
but if they do so in the same, truth-preserving way, which is a condition that is
difficult to meet in any other case than identity in all or in all relevant respects.
The extensional / intensional distinction has been mainly discussed in the con-
text of philosophical semantics, where intensionality is often characterised as the
mark of intentionality, understood as the quality of being meaningful, which in
turn is considered the exclusive domain of thought and language. However, the
origins of this distinction are at least equally close to questions of logic and math-
ematics as they are to language. Among other things, Frege’s analysis provides
the foundation of intensional logic, and it provides the critical backdrop for the
intensional approach to mathematics (Feferman 1985).3 In critique of Platonist
externalism concerning mathematical forms, it highlights the importance of the
mode of presentation of mathematical objects to human beings and the human
3 For further discussions of intensionality in mathematics over the last decades, see Nieber-
gall (2005); Peregrin (2018); Quinon (2019); Shapiro (1985); Sylvan (2003).
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practices of endowing them with meaning. Paradigmatically, “two rules may have
the same values at all arguments but they are not identified unless they are recog-
nized to be the same as rules” (Feferman 1985, 44). However, the project explicitly
refrains from answering questions of intensional identity while inquiring into the
metaphysical foundations of mathematics. The metaphysical issues are even more
evident in the mathematical concept of intensionality than in the linguistic one:
what is the nature of a sign in relation both to a designated world affair and to
its users?
The preceding tentative analysis of intensionality will help to answer the ques-
tion whether analogies in behaviour and function are sufficient to support equiv-
alence in computations. If identity in intensional properties between human and
machine computation were required, it would likely never come to pass, first, be-
cause it demands that the mode of presentation of any function and any route
towards a computational solutions would have to be identical for all systems un-
der consideration. Second, however, the systems under consideration are sensitive
to an identical mode of presentation in variant ways, depending on their respective
constitution. To the extent they are designed to perform computations, the sys-
tems will perform computations that exemplify the same mathematical structure
in different – paradigmatically neuronal, continuous versus electronic, discrete –
ways in many cases precisely in order to be able to produce the same results. This
is the first case against intensional identity.
Conversely, if the mode of presentation remains identical across various systems
and therefore is insensitive to variations in their nature, the outcomes of the com-
putational process, if there are any, are more likely to diverge than if the mode of
presentation systematically maps their variations in nature. Intensional contexts
are not truth-preserving precisely because contexts that are otherwise identical
might produce diverging results for variantly disposed human beings. Even if one
merely compares the operations of various digital computing devices, one and the
same set of instructions and input variables might be straightforwardly computable
for one system, require patches for another and be wholly unusable for a third,
depending on such mundane technological factors as the processor architectures
or operating systems used. This is the second case against intensional identity.
Moreover, even if one weakened the condition of intensional identity to “identi-
cal in every relevant respect”, the question would remain what the relevant aspects
are on the spectrum between producing an identical solution to an identical prob-
lem in extensionally equivalent ways and fundamentally being a type-identical
system. In fact, the strategy adopted by anti-computationalists like Searle (1980)
is to demand type-identity between the systems under consideration in order to
grant them the status of computational equivalence: Only those physical systems
which are human organisms compute in such a way that genuine intentional phe-
nomena such as language understanding and consciousness will come to pass. The
third case against intensional identity is not directed at the concept itself but at
this specific line of argument, which not merely refuses to consider any possible
form of equivalence apart from identity, but also ties identity to the presence of
a an array of human-specific psychological phenomena and their qualities. These,
however, are not per se part of the concept of intensionality. In a certain respect,
the Searlean argument is fashioned as an answer to the Qb version of the research
question, where that answers amounts to a version of condition e.1 above: Any
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computation in the relevant sense would have to belong to the domain of human
computation, which remains unattainable for machines by definition.
On the background both of these considerations and of the original observations
concerning extensional equivalence between early theories of computation, there
should be defensible routes towards equivalence between computation in human
beings and machines. Such equivalence will paradigmatically be extensional, but
intensional identity might have a circumscribed domain of application. Extensional
equivalence might be established for all those levels and aspects of human cognition
which are amenable to a computational account at all, and for all those levels
and aspects of machine operations which are equally subsumable under such an
account. The open questions to be discussed in the remainder of this essay are
twofold: First, on the cognitive side, how much of human cognition is subsumable
under a computational account, and what is the status of these levels and aspects?
Second, on the computational side, will the concepts of computation involved
remain restricted to LCM-style computation?
Before turning to the first question in the next section (5), I will briefly indicate
a route towards an answer to the second question, which will be taken up again
in Section 6. The currently most comprehensive and systematic account of com-
putation that goes beyond Turing’s LCM computation is the mechanistic account
of computation (Piccinini 2015 and Piccinini and Craver 2011 in particular, but
also Fresco 2014; Mi lkowski 2013). It has the distinction of being both more gen-
eral and more precise than Turing’s account while maintaining his original idea
of multiple realisability of computations. Abstracting from logico-mathematical
problems and the rules of arithmetic while focusing on issues of physical imple-
mentation, the mechanistic account postulates the “medium-independence” and
substrate-neutral “vehicles” of computation. Computation, thus understood, is the
processing of vehicles of any sort – markings on tape, switches in electric circuits
or activation states of neurones – in accordance with rules that are sensitive to
relevant properties of those vehicles. The vehicles and their relevance are defined in
light of the overall properties of the system of which they are part. A system that
computes is a system that can be explained as having been designed or evolved
in such a way that it contains an arrangement of organised features, or shortly a
“mechanism”, with the function of performing computations, thus defined.
The mechanistic account of computation aims to subsume a manifold of types
of processes by means of defining them precisely enough to strike a balance between
avoiding pan-computationalism and an undue restriction to LCM-style computa-
tion. Moreover, it allows to turn one’s primary focus away from Qb-type questions
concerning the deeper nature of computing systems and towards an account of
how they operate, and hence Qa above.
5 The domain of human invention
If the previous discussion is to the point, the anti-computationalist’s charge against
equivalence between human and machine computation is either, in its stronger
form, that it cannot be accomplished at all because it cannot be intensional, or,
in its weaker form, that it may be extensional but then will remain restricted to
those domains of human cognitive activities that can be described in terms of
LCM-style computation. The former charge amounts to denying the possibility
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of computer-based analogues of human cognition, whereas the latter will amount
to curtailing their power and scope. Against this charge, the mechanistic account
of computation goes some way towards broadening the domain of computation
by overcoming the restriction to LCM-style computation. However, unless it opts
for pan-computationalism and its trivialising implications, it cannot rule out the
possibility that there are key domains of human cognition that may still remain
inaccessible to the broader mechanistic concept of computation.
There is a set of well-rehearsed arguments pro and contra cognition being
an intrinsically and irreducibly embodied and situated phenomenon. It is usually
taken to be the direct and symmetric counterpart of arguments pro and contra
computationalism. As these debates cannot be covered here in any reasonable
detail, and especially as one of the aims of this essay is to decouple some of the
presuppositions that are usually made by either party in that dispute, I will take a
slightly different, exemplary perspective on the relation between computation and
cognition. I will consider the role of human invention in mathematics. This choice
is not primarily motivated by the intention to make an argument by example, but
by the prospect of connecting the following considerations to the notion of human
and machine computation in light of possible limitations on human cognition in
the very domain that gave rise to the computational paradigm.
One can provide at least three distinct views of the relevance of invention
and intuition to mathematics, with various possible shades between them, that
have a highly pertinent historical pedigree that manifested in foundational crisis
of mathematics during the early 20th century:4
i.1 Logicism: The role of human invention in mathematics is tightly circumscribed,
as all possible mathematical concepts are founded in, and reducible to, a limited
set of logical axioms, which themselves are self-evident and neither amenable
nor requiring logical proof. These foundational axioms are discovered, not in-
vented. All of arithmetic, even natural numbers can be derived from those foun-
dational axioms. This is the logicist view that was initiated by Frege (1884)
and became influential through the the Principia Mathematica (Whitehead and
Russell 1910-1913), and informed analytic philosophy from Carnap to Wittgen-
stein. This view might be accompanied by, but is distinct from, the Platonic
postulate that the existence and form of mathematical objects are indepen-
dent of human thought, too. In any case, however, logicism is committed to
the view that mathematical forms are meaningful first and foremost in an ex-
tensional sense, with all invention, convention and other human factors being
subordinate to this condition.
i.2 Formalism: The role of human invention in mathematics is significant but cir-
cumscribed, as mathematics is conventional in the same sense in which natural
language is conventional: it is based on signs whose shape is a matter of in-
vention and agreement and may operate freely in this respect while, taken
as a sign system, it is subject to definite rules that express necessary forms
of reasoning. In particular, the mathematical language game is supposed to
be uniform, complete and non-contradictory. This is the formalist view that
4 The following reconstruction is largely based on the exchange between Carnap (1931);
Heyting (1931); von Neumann (1931) and the accompanying discussion by various authors
(1931) in the second volume of Erkenntnis, which occurred at a time when the foundational
crisis had mostly subsided, and hence with the benefit of hindsight.
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has been paradigmatically formulated by Hilbert (beginning in 1900). In a
reversal of the logicist view (i.1), it sought to reduce logic to mathematics
and expressly shunned ontological commitments concerning the reference of
mathematical symbols. Not least by providing the critical backdrop for Turing
(1936), it directly informed theories of computation. Its closest philosophical
cousin is the hypothetico-deductive paradigm in philosophy of science (Popper
1959), according to which free-form, intuition-guided invention of hypotheses
may become important to the context of discovery in many cases (see also
Einstein’s notion of an “Einfu¨hlung in die Erfahrung”, 1918, 31), whereas the
context of justification is marked by hypotheis-testing and thereby fleshing out
fundamental natural constraints.
i.3 Intuitionism: The role of human invention in mathematics is fundamental and
only minimally constrained, as virtually all mathematical principles and ob-
jects are human-made, not only the conventions of mathematical notation.
Mathematical objects have no independent existence, nor are they reducible to
logic (i.1) or to the contingencies of linguistic construction (i.2). Mathematical
objects are created by the human mind and exist in the human mind. The
function of mathematical symbols and notation is to represent those mental
entities. This is the intuitionist view that has been introduced by Brouwer
(1907/1975) and that lost its influence on mathematics after the 1920ies, while
having a parallel in later constructivist theories in philosophy. According to
the intuitionist view, the only principled mathematical constraints on human
inventiveness in mathematics lie in natural number concepts and elementary
arithmetic operations – which arguably can be found to some extent in some
animals, too (see Dehaene 2011; Fabry 2018). All remaining constraints are
cognitive in nature, ultimately imposed by the structure and limits of human
neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, and hence practical, not principled in kind.
Of the views discussed here, the intuitionist (i.3) fared most poorly in terms of
continued acceptance or even acknowledgement of merit, at least the latter of
which can be safely ascribed to logicism (i.1). When it comes to continued accep-
tance, formalism (i.2) has been most successful. Despite or possibly because of the
demonstrated failure of its completeness theorem, it nurtured computationalism.
If there are principled constraints on human inventiveness in mathematical
matters, according to i.1, and if these are in some respects metaphysical, pace
Carnap (1959), because there is a logical structure of the world with which we
cannot argue, there still will be no implication that human inventiveness needs to
be rejected or curtailed in its status in other areas than logic and mathematics.
After all, religion, art an other areas of human cognitive activity might actually
require a relative absence of the logic and a strong presence of inventiveness in
order to thrive (as Carnap 1959 did not hesitate to admit). However, unless it
can be demonstrated that these other areas of human thinking and activity are
at least similarly central to the entire conditio humana as are logic and mathe-
matics and may exert an influence on them, the domain of human cognition will
remain relatively restricted to what logic and mathematics can accomplish. Hu-
man computation, in Turing’s terms, will be one, arguably minor but genuinely
representative, constituent of that relatively restricted domain. It will most likely
be unable able to expand that domain.
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If there is a significant domain for human invention in mathematical matters
that is still subject a set of principled constraints, according to i.2, the domain of
invention can be circumscribed by means of these constraints. If these constraints
lie in the logical forms that human reasoning, qua reasoning, necessarily has to
assume, they can be expressed accordingly, and hence at least potentially in com-
putational terms. After all, i.2 is the approach most inclined towards granting the
possibility of computational descriptions of the widest possible range of world af-
fairs. Its conventionalist, quasi-linguistic premises are a central feature to resurface
in the theories of computation that descended from it. On this background, the
formalist may admit but is not compelled to acknowledge the existence of elements
of human cognition that are essentially not computational in nature. If admitting
for the existence of such elements, he or she will either be able to maintain that
they might still be describable on the grounds of the conventions of a computa-
tional language or, if such a description is not forthcoming, that its domain can
be defined ex negativo.
If, however, there are virtually no principled constraints on human inventive-
ness according to i.3, there will neither be a need for circumscribing the boundaries
of its domain in logical or computational terms, nor will there be a possibility of
doing so. Any and all formal principles that human thinkers do and possibly could
devise will arise from a domain that is intrinsically not bound to or defined by
such principles. In this case, there is no reason, on the one hand, to assume either
that human cognition is computational in nature in any recognisable way or even
that it may receive a comprehensive and authoritative description in the terms of
one of the many possible descriptions that the human mind can devise. On the
other hand, it is perfectly conceivable on this view that the power of human inven-
tiveness is such that, given enough time and resources, more comprehensive and
authoritative descriptions of human cognition may be devised than the expressly
limited computational analogy devised by Turing or any of its descendants could
furnish. The intuitionist view might even allow for the notion of machines to be
invented that are cognitively more powerful than the unaided human mind. They
might not be computing machines though.
6 Machine abilities and constraints
After the possible types of equivalence between human and machine computation
have been clarified in Section 4, and after the possible extension of the domain
of human cognition vis-a-vis human computation has been explored by proxy of
the status of invention in mathematics in Section 5, what is still missing from
the picture is an exploration of the domains of machine activities that might go
beyond LCM-style computation. In order to obtain the other half of the picture, I
will return to the bearing of variant concepts of computation (see Section 3 above)
on the domain of machine computation.
According to definitions c.1 and c.2 on p. 5, everything that an LCM or ‘Tur-
ing Machine’ can solve is computable. It has been a matter of controversy whether
Turing’s conception of the LCM was meant to be strictly constrained by the be-
haviours of a human computer, defined as a person doing calculations with pencil
and paper (Copeland 2017), or whether it was – even purposefully – indifferent to
the human versus machine nature of the system doing the computations (Hodges
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2008). Either way, Turing-computability as originally conceived did not concern
principled abilities or limitations of machines qua machines. The LCM was intro-
duced as a theoretical machine in the first place, while providing key elements of
the design of digital computing machines first built a decade after Turing’s 1936
publication.
Even though Turing introduced the concept of the LCM by proxy of the model
of human activities of computation, the possible interpretations of how real or
conceivable machines may simulate these activities will matter. After all, the spec-
ification condition that defines the elements of an LCM (c.2) has often been taken
literally, as a blueprint of the functional structure of real machines. Consider-
ations of machine computation will thereby be narrowed down to the original
analogy with the behaviour of human computers, hence in disregard of the cogni-
tive processes that realise this behaviour. All and only those machines which meet
this specification, paradigmatically or exclusively digital computers, will rightfully
count as computers. No machine that adheres to c.2 will be able to accomplish
more than what is specified in c.1. Any machine that exceeds the abilities defined
in c.1 will have to do so by means other than those specified in c.2.
Conversely, the domain condition that defines what process count as com-
putable (c.1) has often been interpreted in a maximal sense, as implying not only
that every function that any machine can solve is computable, but also that LCMs,
as specified in c.2, will be in principle able simulate the operations of those other
machines. The previous constraint that commits the notion of computation to the
model of the behaviours of human computers would thereby be lifted, and a poorly
defined prospect of LCM-style computational solutions to any function opened up
– which is not what Turing appears to have had in mind.
This point can be elucidated by reference to Robin Gandy’s “Thesis M” (1980,
124), which is derived but expressly distinct from Turing’s thesis. It plainly states:
“What can be calculated by a machine is computable”. This thesis is intended to
highlight the possibility that some machines may compute a function in ways that
are not accessible to a human computer, paradigmatically in the case of machines
that use parallel processing. Beyond this rather modest point, Thesis M, too, has
been variously interpreted to mean that “whatever can be calculated by a machine
can be calculated by a Turing machine” (Copeland 2017, 10) or that “anything
that a machine can do is computable” (Hodges 2008, 86-7). These are quite dis-
tinct claims concerning the scope of possible accomplishments of machines: On the
first view (according to Copeland’s rephrasing), Turing computability will reign
supreme, either within its own delimited domain because machines cannot accom-
plish more than what the LCM does, or, on a much stronger interpretation, the
LCM may transcend its own boundaries by simulating the behaviour of machines
that accomplish tasks that go beyond its original specification. On the second view
(according to Hodges’ rephrasing), the notion of computation is not restricted to
LCM-style computation in the first place.
In fact, both Thesis M and the most overbearing interpretations of Turing’s
programme have given rise to the maximal interpretation of the nature of compu-
tation, which includes the notion of conceivable machines that could, in principle,
computationally solve more than the set of LCM-computable functions. This no-
tion raises the question of whether we should still refer to whatever goes on in
those more powerful machines as computation, and why we should do so. If we
take Turing’s definition at face value, computability is always relative to the design
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of his LCM, and it would take some justification to call Turing as witness in an
argument for a notion of computation that is not covered by, let alone compatible
with, his own definition.
However, to complement his own restrictive concept of computation, Turing
introduced the notion of an “oracle”, which could solve some or possibly all the
functions that an LCM cannot solve by providing a distinct, “hypercomputational”
mechanism.5 Given that Turing did not specify what the nature of such a mecha-
nism might be except “that it cannot be a machine” while, nonetheless, “with the
help of the oracle we could form a new kind of machine” (Turing 1939, 173), there
are two divergent interpretations of what an oracle could be and accomplish:
o.1 If any machine is necessarily restricted to computable functions in terms of
Turing’s LCM, there will be principled limitations on conceiving and building
a machine that could solve any non-computable function. If there is an oracle,
it will not be a machine (Hodges’ interpretation).
o.2 If Turing’s oracle could inform the operations of a real machine, a machine
would become possible that solves non-Turing-computable functions. There
will be no principled limitations on what a machine could potentially accom-
plish, but that machine would not be a LCM (Copeland’s interpretation).
Matching this distinction against the distinction between different readings of the
role of human inventiveness in mathematics in Section 5, we end up with two con-
trasting ‘no principled limitations’ claims concerning human inventiveness (i.3)
and machine abilities (o.2) respectively, and with two contrasting ‘principled limi-
tations’ claims (a stronger i.1 and a weaker i.2 versus o.1). These contrasting claims
will have distinctive implications concerning the possibility and limitations of Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI), especially with respect to the question whether machines
are conceivable whose computational or hypercomputational abilities approximate
or are equivalent to key elements of human cognition. I will refer to this latter pos-
sibility as “Strong AI”. If we juxtapose the positions discussed under “i.n” and
“o.n”, the following landscape of hypotheses emerges:
h.1 If most or all mathematical principles are human inventions, with no princi-
pled boundaries (as in i.3), and if human beings could build a machine that
solves non-Turing-computable functions that captures non-Turing-computable
elements of the human mind (as in o.2), this machine would not be a Turing
Machine but involve an oracle in a yet-to-be specified manner. Strong AI would
be possible in principle but would have to match the near unlimited degrees of
freedom of human inventiveness.
h.2 If most or all mathematical principles are human inventions, with no princi-
pled boundaries (as in i.3), and if human beings nonetheless remain unable
to build machines that solve non-Turing-computable functions that capture
non-Turing-computable elements of the human mind (as in o.1), it would still
remain possible in principle to invent other, yet unspecified methods of solv-
ing those functions that do not involve machines. There would only be Turing
Machines, hence no machine-based route to Strong AI.
5 For the coining of the term “hypercomputation”, see Copeland and Proudfoot (1999); for
an overview of hypercomputational approaches, see Copeland (2002); for a recent example of
a concrete approach, see Stacewicz (2019).
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h.3 If all or at least some fundamental mathematical principles are not human
inventions (as in i.1 and i.2 respectively), and if there are principled constraints
on what a machine could provide in terms of computational solutions that
would confine them to Turing-computability (as in o.1), the constraints in
question will probably but not necessarily be stricter for machines than for
humans. Any kind of AI would only be possible within the confines both of
Turing computability and of the respective i.n condition.
h.4 If all or at least some fundamental mathematical principles are not human
inventions (as in i.1 and i.2 respectively), and if there are no principled con-
straints on what machines could provide in terms of computational solutions
that would confine them to Turing-computability (as in o.2), any remaining
constraint could in principle be no stricter for machines than for humans.
Strong AI would be possible but it would not be Turing-Machine-based AI.
This landscape of possibilities does not explicitly cover all in-principle imagin-
able scenarios, but it may include them as more or less plausible variants. Both
h.1 and h.2 can be rendered in such a way as to appear straightforwardly anti-
computationalist – if we take condition i.3 to mean that the human mind is non-
computational in important respects, and if we assume that machines that embody
some of its key properties are either impossible or would not be computing ma-
chines anymore. Conversely, a scenario in which humans and machines alike are
confined to LCM-style computation would be an extreme version of h.3, in that
it identifies the constraints on human inventiveness in particular and cognition
in general with the boundaries of LCM-style computation. Likewise, h.4 can be
pushed towards including a scenario in which human beings invent an artefact
whose underlying computational principles they themselves could not possibly
comprehend. This case would be qualitatively different from the epistemic opacity
of advanced AI systems, where the issue lies in limitations on human cognitive
tracking of their operations, so that we understand the principles but fail at the
task of grasping their execution in scope, speed and complexity.
As instructive as these hypothetical scenarios may be, there is an aspect of h.3
and h.4 in particular that is more relevant to the present context. In postulating
more restrictive i.n conditions and thus limiting the presumed degrees of freedom
of human invention in the very domain of human cognition that also defines the
boundaries of computation, they include the possibility that machine computation
approximates, becomes equivalent to or even exceeds that more restricted set of
human abilities, either on an LCM or a hypercomputational level. The question is
what the nature of this equivalence would be in light of the intensional / extensional
distinction outlined in Section 4, and how it may come to pass.
If the humans and machines involved are found to accomplish the same tasks
and solve the same problems to the same degree but in distinct ways that each
match their respective constitution and abilities, their operations will be exten-
sionally equivalent. They will map the same solutions onto the same problems in
distinct but rule-governed ways that ensure equivalence between them. If and when
a strong version of the “formalist” i.2 condition applies, the accomplishments of
machines will be in correspondence to key constituents of human cognitive abili-
ties to the extent they trace necessary forms of human reasoning. The functions
of the machines are specified in line with mathematical conventions that share
these foundations but are otherwise malleable in light of human knowledge and
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purposes. According to h.3, the fact that LCM-style computation merely concerns
an analogy between machine functions and the behaviour of human computers
will impose a necessary and fairly strict limitation on machine abilities. In the
most generic type of case, this analogy disallows, for example, parallel distributed
processing in machines because this is not how a person calculates with pencil and
paper. There will be no such principled limitation that would be imposed by h.4, as
it allows for the invention of machines that transcend LCM-style computation by
any means that come to pass but that might remain uninformative with respect
to how human cognitive abilities might be computationally realised. LCM-style
computation is unlikely to achieve much in this respect.
If we consider the mechanistic concept of computation instead of the LCM,
the distinction between h.3 and h.4 will assume a different shape: it will concern
possible deeper analogies between computational operations inherent in human
cognition and machine computation. Here, a pertinent example would be biologi-
cally realistic neural network modelling (which at the level of basic imolementation
remains committed to LCM-computational principles though). The extension of
the domains of human and machine computation could be made equivalent on the
basis of any such analogy that might still be discovered. The question will become
whether there are relevant and genuine non-computational elements of human cog-
nition, and whether and to what extent analogues of these could be implemented
in hypercomputing machines.
If, in contrast, the humans and machines involved are presented with the same
tasks in the same way, and if they also solve them in the same way in all relevant
respects, their operations will be intensionally identical. As a minimum condition,
both the mode of presentation and the solution will remain insensitive to any vari-
ation in internal realisation of the solution process. A pertinent example of what
is required here would be an enriched version of the Logical Neurone model (Mc-
Culloch and Pitts 1943): If there is a structure and a set of operational principles
that is realised both by a logical calculus and by the human nervous system, and
if it can be demonstrated that the same processes describable by the same logical
calculus will occur in a human nervous system and a computer implementation of
that calculus, provided that both are presented with the same input variables in
the same way, a case for intensional identity might be made. The requirements in-
volved would be very steep though, as the requisite mode of presentation might be
that of visual perception and also include elements of, necessarily embodied, self-
perception. If and when a strong version of the “logicist” i.1 condition is applied
to cases of this kind, the degrees of freedom of human invention in mathematics
that are involved will be tightly constrained by a logical structure of the world
to which all well-founded mathematical principles correspond. To the extent that
computing machines are organised and operate along these principles, they will
make reference to that same logical structure of the world.
Given that disallowing any variation in internal realisation of the relevant func-
tions would forestall any comparison between human and machine computation,
and given that such a requirement is not part of the concept of intensionality, the
degrees of variation that are still reconcilable with the condition of an identical
mode of presentation will have to be determined through empirical investigation.
The logicist approach i.1 is quite well-disposed towards identifying these condi-
tions though, as it postulates a logical structure of the world that may serve as a
common external reference point. To the extent that human cognition partakes in
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that logical structure of the world, some degree of equivalence between its functions
and operations and the functions and operations of machines will be conceivable.
To the extent that human cognition does not partake in that logical structure, it
will remain beyond the reach of any machine that embodies the computational
principles that build on that structure. Either way, the basis of comparison cannot
be LCM-style computation, as it only concerns behaviour-based analogies with hu-
man computers, which will be too narrow an analogy. Even on the weaker concept
of intensionality proposed here, the comparison will concern aspects of internal
realisation or implementation, and hence will be better based on a mechanistic
concept of computation that is able to formulate identity conditions with suffi-
cient precision and generality.
7 Conclusion
The synthesis of the discussion in the preceding sections is this: In pursuit of ten-
tative and partial answer to question Qa, Section 3 demonstrated that the concept
of computation was originally modelled on human computers but designed in such
a way as to be implementable in a certain kind of machines, namely Turing’s LCM.
It has later been refined in order to cover a broader range of phenomena by means
of a more abstract notion of “mechanical” computation that can be implemented
in a greater variety of systems, both natural and artificial. Section 4 explored
the possible types of equivalence between human and machine computation, con-
cluding that extensional equivalence between certain effects of certain operations
in human beings and machines can be established, whereas intensional identity
needs to be considered an undue requirement for either, especially in light of the
subsidiary requirement that they would have to be identical in nature in every
relevant respect. Section 5 developed an overview of the scope of those human
cognitive abilities which might go beyond the domain of extensional equivalence
between computational operations, with particular focus on the relation between
human invention in mathematics and computation. Finally, section 6 juxtaposed
this image with an image of the domain of possible machine activities that go
beyond LCM-style computation.
In the course of this argument, I have tried to provide a partial answer to the
Qc version of the initial research question by proxy of providing a partial answer
to its Qa version. However, that answer is not one that tells us what computation
in human beings and machines actually is and what the differences between them
really are in a metaphysical sense or by logico-mathematical proof. It is much
more open-ended in at least two ways. First, my partial and pragmatically minded
answer focuses on the activities of human beings and machines, not on their nature,
in that it highlights the importance of extensional equivalence of operations with
respect to solving a certain set of problems. Intensional identity in the strong
sense mobilised by anti-computationalists is not required and, although partly
defensible in a weaker sense, remains difficult to unequivocally establish. Second,
I have made case for the relation between human and machine abilities to be
treated an open question, and as multi-faceted rather than as a strict dichotomy.
Any possible decision for one position or another will have rich and normatively
relevant implications. On most of the more tenable accounts outlined above, the
domains of human cognition and machine computation will be distinct in kind and
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extension, but this will be a matter of empirical investigation and concrete human
invention.
Ultimately, I have made a case for reconsidering the concept of machine that
is involved here. Where anti-computationalists defined machines as precisely those
entities which never might and never will match human accomplishments, so that
any hypothetical machine that might transgress this boundary would cease to be
perceived and referred to as a machine (as Collins and Kusch 1998 appear to ar-
gue), the arguments brought forward here remain agnostic with respect to this
criterion. Any principled limitations on the possibility and the abilities of conceiv-
able artefacts do not fall into one with the factual limits of one’s imagination. After
all, Turing (1950, 442) made a point of using his LCM for pushing the envelope of
the meaning of the word “machine” at a time when the paradigm of machines still
were power machines and when computing machines where only emerging. On all
accounts, he has been at least moderately successful in pushing that envelope.
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